Aston Villa have a very consistent build-up structure this season under Emery. In the first phase, starting with the goal kick, it’s often a 424. The centre backs split wide, and Martinez in goal takes part to form a back three. The wide midfielders and the two strikers are quite high up the pitch to open up the middle for the double pivot.
The aim is to get the ball to Pau Torres, who is one of the best ball-playing defenders in the world, and make use of his incredible passing range. Rotations in wide areas and clever movement by the forwards are a common tactic to open up the passing lanes for their centre back.
A rotation we often see is the left back (mostly Digne) pushing high and wide while the left winger (mostly McGinn or Ramsey) drifting inside into more central areas with the goal of overloading the opposition’s back four. Does the right back follow his man inside? Or should he take on the overlapping left back?
Another movement is the number 10 (mostly Rogers) dropping a bit deeper to pull one centre back out while Wakins, the other striker, looks for a run into the channel. Torres then has a vast array of options to pass to, also with the options of finding one of the defensive midfielders or to turn back and pass it to his fellow centre back.
This creates an overload against the opposition’s back line. It turns into a 5 vs. 4. This is also how they scored the winner in their opening fixture against West Ham.
How can you stop this pattern of play?
Early in the season, Wolves showed an interesting approach to how to limit Aston Villa’s chances of progressing through the thirds. It was a simple approach, but they executed it well and even scored the 1:0 lead from the high press. They gave it all away towards the end and lost 3:1 but showed a blueprint of how teams can press Emery’s side. Let’s break it down:
Wolves lined up in a 4231, which was more of a 4141 out of possession. The back four of Semedo, Mosquera, Dawson, and Ait-Nouri went man-to-man with Villa’s strikers, with summer signing André as a holding midfielder, tasked with blocking any vertical passes into the forward line. The other five were the protagonists of the high press. Joao Gomes pushed up, next to Lemina, who was the number 10 in this game. Cunha played down the left, Bellegarde down the right, and Jørgen Strand Larsen up front.
Gary O’Neil had a clear plan out of possession, and that was to limit any balls played to Torres. Larsen marked the Spaniard, blocking off any potential passes. Villa’s left-hand side was completely taken out of the game, also due to Bellegarde marking Digne at left back, following him anytime he looked to push forward. Wolves would momentarily form a back five to counteract the attempt of creating an overload.
Wolves forced the pass to Diego Carlos, the right centre back, due to his inferior ball-playing ability compared to his centre back partner. Lemina and Gomes would mark the double pivot, but when Carlos received the ball, Lemina would push up to close him down, and Gomes would shift across to the left to take up the right defensive midfielder of Villa, which was often Onana. Larsen dropped off slightly into midfield to offer support. Cunha also wouldn’t mark the right back, leaving the pass open. He would sit inside, blocking off any potential direct passes into the front line.
When the ball was played out wide to the right back, Cunha would jump, understanding it as his pressing trigger. Lemina would support the press, arriving from behind after pressing the centre back.
This simple, well-thought-out tactic made life difficult for the Villains and also led to the goal conceded.
